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Abstract 
Zero day Cyber-attacks created potential impacts on the way 
information is held and protected, however one of the vital 
priorities for governments, agencies and organizations is to 
secure their network businesses, transactions and 
communications, simultaneously to avoid security policy and 
privacy violations under any circumstances. Covert Channel is 
used to in/ex-filtrate classified data secretly, whereas encryption 
is used merely to protect communication from being decoded by 
unauthorized access. In this paper, we propose a new Security 
Model to mitigate security attacks on legitimate targets misusing 
IPv6 vulnerabilities. The approach analyses, detects and 
classifies hidden communication channels through implementing 
an enhanced feature selection algorithm with a coherent Naive 
Bayesian Classifier. NBC is one of the most prominent 
classification algorithm defining the highest probability in data 
mining area. The proposed framework uses Intelligent Heuristic 
Algorithm (IHA) to analyse and create a novel primary training 
data, furthermore a modified Decision Tree C4.5 technique is 
suggested to classify the richest attribute presenting hidden 
channels in IPv6 network. The results evaluation showed better 
detection performance, high accuracy in True Positive Rate 
(TPR) and a low False Negative Rate (FNR) and a clear attribute 
ranking.  
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1. Introduction 
Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) as shown in Figure 1, 
expressly designed as a successor for IPv4. While the 
protocol itself is already over a decade old but currently its 
adoption’s infancy reaching 7% in the world. The low 
acceptance of IPv6 results in an insufficient understanding 
of its security properties as mentioned in [1], despite of the 
security improvements, IPv6 had no cryptographic 
protection when it was deployed and even the successful 
deployment of IPsec within IPv6 would not give any 
guarantee or additional security against hidden channel 
attacks [9]. Covert channels have been defined in many 
ways; Lampson (1973) was the first that recognized them 
as storage channels between two monolithic systems 
 
However these channels were not meant to be used for 
communications [5]. Most of researchers in Network and 
data security defined them as enforced, illicit signalling 
channels that allow a user to stealthily, contravene targeted 
objective [2], [4]. 
The protocol dimension representing the changed and new 
fields values in pcap data according to the multi-level 
separation policy and unobservable requirements of any 
RFC 2460 as shown in Figure 2. The utmost information 
that an IPv6 packet could carry is distributed into 40 octets 
(320 bits) called mandatory fixed headers and sub optional 
extension headers. IPv6 consists of eight main header 
fields, these fields have potential to carry covert channels 
depending on each fields modified values in the packet 
transmission over the net as indicated in [1], [2] and [4]. 
 
 
 
There are two types of covert channels: storage and timing 
in which categorized under two types of taxonomies: 
variable and predictable according to our performed 
analysis and the protocol’s RFCs standard values in [3], 
[4]. A predictable cover means there is no variation, 
whereas a variable cover means there is a limited 
variation. Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 
(ICMPv6) as shown in Figure 3 is a vital component and 
an integral part of IPv6 and must be fully implemented by 
every IPv6 node according to RFC 4443 protocol 
specifications and IANA assigned values [1]. Table I 
shows examples of possible IPv6 covert channels 
characteristics. 
Fig. 1: IPv6 Header Format 
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ICMPv6 reports errors encountered in processing packets 
[6], [8,] and it does other internet-layer functions such as 
diagnostics. It produces two types of messages: 
Information Notification and Error Notification using type 
and code fields to differentiate services, in which both are 
vulnerable to variety of attacks including; denial of 
Service (DoS), Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) and spoofing 
attacks [3],[10]. 
 
Each of these messages carries a next header value of 58, 
which includes a Type value for message specification. 
The Type ranges (1-127) are for error messages and from 
(128-255) are for information messages. Having said that 
and the arbitrary content of the ICMPv6 payload may 
carry different types of data according to the messages 
types and ranges mentioned earlier, besides the Operating 
Systems type used too [12].   
 
 
 
However, sometimes ICMPv6 packet contains 
insignificant or null values which indicate that potential 
covert channels could be existed, although ICMPv6 cannot 
do anything if the protocol itself commits an error [4]. 
 
The research question that motivated this project was: Is it 
possible to detect hidden communication channels in 
IPv6? If yes, then another sub question could be asked. 
Why this Internet Protocol has not been investigated by 
many researchers and what possible different method can 
be implemented to tackle and mitigate the security 
vulnerabilities in this New Generation Protocol? 
 
 
 
2. Related Work 
2.1 Network Covert Channels and Detection 
Techniques 
Previous researchers in network covert channels focused 
on IPv4 [2], [4], [6], however fewer researchers concerned 
in the security vulnerabilities of the new generation IPv6 
due to its incomplete implementation. Hidden information 
could be transferred very easy in the data section of the 
packet due to the large size and relatively unstructured in 
comparison to headers fields. Covert channels could be 
encoded in the unused or reserved bits in the packet header 
frame, these unused header fields are designed for future 
protocol improvements, and mostly they are dismissed by 
IDS and Firewalls [14],[17] furthermore this exception 
caused by the in-existence of specific values in protocol 
standards [8],[9]. 
 
Handel and Sandford in [1] proposed a covert channel 
exploiting the unused bits of the type of service (TOS) IP 
header or the Flags field in TCP header. Ahsan and 
Kundur in [2] suggested five hidden channels approaches 
manipulating the headers in TCP, IGMP and ICMP and 
one of them in packet sorting within the IPsec protocol. 
Hintz in [1], [9] proposed to use the Urgent Pointer in TCP 
to transmit covert data. Lucena et al suggested a number of 
covert channels in IPv6 header fields i.e. Traffic Class and 
Flow Label, Hop-by-Hop, Fragment, Authentication and 
Encapsulating Security Payload extension headers [1]. 
Time consumption and the complexity of detection process 
were noticed in her attempt. The same attempt was 
performed in [19] sending nonzero octets in data part of 
PadN option in Destination option extension header. 
 
Rowland proposed to multiply each byte of the hidden data 
by 256 and use it directly as IP ID [2] meanwhile the IP 
identification header field is used for reassembling 
fragmented IP packets. The main requirement from RFC 
0791 for the IP standard is that IP packet is uniquely 
identified by IP ID for a certain temporary time [8, 9]. 
Rutkowska proposed a developed covert channel using 
TCP ISNs for Linux using encryption [2, 8]. Furthermore 
Murdoch and Lewis [1, 2] proposed different idea about 
ISN covert channels techniques that they might produce 
different outcome than the real operating system 
implementation. Rutkowska proposed a developed covert 
channel using TCP ISNs for Linux deploying encryption 
[2], [9]. 
Qu et al [6] suggested a technique for covert information 
to be embedded into the Time to Live (TTL) and the Hop 
Limit field so as Lucena in [1]. Zander et al [2] analysed 
both proposed initial TTL values by Qu and Lucena, and 
suggested an encoded covert channels, which is harder to 
detect.  
ID Field Covert Channel Bandwidth 
1 Traffic  Class Set a false traffic class 8bits/packet 
2 Flow Label Set a false flow label 20 bits/packet 
3 
Payload 
Length 
Increase value to insert 
extra data 
Various 
4 Next Header 
Set a valid value to add 
an extra extension 
header 
Various 
5 Hop limit Increase/decrease value ≈ 1 bit/packet 
6 
Source 
Address 
Set a false source 
address 
16bytes/packet 
Fig. 2: IPv6 PCAP Data in Header Fields 
 
Table 1: Identified Covert Channels in IPv6 Header  
Fig. 3: ICMPv6 Header Format 
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Sohn et al in [13] mentioned the Support Vector Machine 
in passive warden to detect TCP covert channels within the 
IP ID and TCP ISN. This method is not preferable for well 
understood and explicit features in his proposed IP IDs and 
ISNs steganography covert channels, furthermore Support 
Vector Machine (SVM) can only identify simple aspects 
of tested data and seems unlikely to detect complex 
structure deployed in TCP/IP fields and their 
interdependencies [8]. 
 
Project Loki suggested exploring the concept of ICMP 
tunnelling in [8, 16] by using covert channels through the 
data portions of the ICMP_ECHO and 
ICMP_ECHOREPLY packets. The attacker wraps the 
commands and transmits them in the ICMP payloads, 
created a server Lokid once received the commands, 
unwrap them and execute them, then transferring the result 
back again wrapped in ICMP packets. Frikha and Trabelsi 
in [4] suggested a complex theory in triple processes 
within one security system, theoretically the approach was 
effective but it was not fully implemented. 
2.2 Naïve Bayes Algorithm 
NBA is a simple probabilistic classifier applying Bayes 
theorem but with a strong independence assumptions, 
which called class conditional independence because it 
assumes that an effect of an attributes value on a given 
class is independent. It allows the representation of 
dependencies among subsets of attributes; therefore, NBA 
is the fastest learning algorithm examining all its training 
inputs [12], [14, [18]. Let say Ck, C representing a class 
type with subset k as an attribute in which needs to be 
classified. Each class should have a probability denoted 
P(Ck) that represents the prior probability of classifying an 
attribute into Ck, meanwhile the value that Ck has, will be 
estimated from the training dataset. Let say that an 
attribute such as n values, Xn, so the objective of 
classification is quite clearly to estimate and find the 
conditional probability of P (Ck| X1, X2, X3…Xn) therefore 
the probability is calculated according to Bayes rule: 
 
We can write this rule as below: 
P (Ck |Xn) = (X1, X2 …Xn |Ck) P (Ck) = P(X1, X2 … Xn) 
Key data: 
P= Probability (of effective existence of the likelihood) 
C= Class {Normal, Covert} 
X= Data {attributes value} 
k= tuple given the class {the subset values of each 
attributes}  
3. Proposed Security Model  
New attempts required to detect storage covert channel 
in IPv6 using different approaches, methodologies 
advanced MLA in respond to the novel vulnerabilities in 
this protocol. This approach could act as a countermeasure 
restrain against sophisticated attack tools used by hackers.  
Using supervised Machine Learning to tackle such 
network threats in IPv6 will add a new rout of cutting-edge 
solutions for security systems. Most of the existing 
methods in [1]-[4] dealing with IPv6 covert channels have 
the following issues [8]: 
o Approaches are complicated using complex 
algorithms to detect encrypted covert channels. 
o Creating traffic congestion while processing. 
o Time consumption in online detection 
o Few parameters are considerable while dealing with 
covert channels of the specified style “paragraph” 
from the drop-down menu of style categories  
Various approaches currently exist for anomaly detection: 
signature, behaviour and protocol based detection; few 
researchers used machine-learning technique to tackle 
covert channels in IPv6 and ICMPv6 due to the 
complexity of the protocol inherited oversight design. Our 
approach as shown in figure 4 uses pattern behaviour 
analysis of the header value to determine the identification 
that covert data has been transferred without affecting the 
normal communication and by passing the firewall too. In 
the first step of the proposed framework, we designed and 
configured a separate LAN as shown in figure 5 for IPv6 
according to the network system environment. A Security 
script tool written in Python programming language was 
created as client and server running on the sender and the 
receiver hosts on the designed LAN, in addition to The 
Hacker Choice (THC) tool which is written in C 
programming language to simulate different attacks using 
ten fields to embed covert channels in both protocols IPv6 
and ICMPv6 [3], [8], [16]. The framework consists of five 
modules as shown in Figure 4: 
 
1) Capture Raw Data Module: Jpcap library packet sniffer 
is a Java API used to capture packets for 3 minutes. 
 2) Data Pre-processing Module: Input pcap data go 
through field selection and the following sub steps: 
a) Packet Transformation: data needs to be decoded 
into numeric values in order to be compatible 
input for the next step analysis. 
b)  Packet Normalization: data need to be 
normalized in order to enhance the performance. 
c) Packet Discretization: data needs to be discretized 
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to create a consistency value type of the fields to 
facilitate feature selection. 
3) Covert Channel Analyser:  
a) Detection Algorithm: the input of this module  
 
 
is the selected fields with their values, here we run an     
Intelligent Heuristic Algorithm (IHA) to create training 
dataset and to detect the covert channels referring to the 
Request for Comments (RFC) and Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority (IANA) rules. The output is the clear 
formatted data derived into two classes numerically 1 and 
0, 1 is covert (anomaly) and 0 is normal. Each individual 
attribute consist of sub-set various values depending on its 
attributes holding type. 
 
 
 
 4) Classification Module: formatted data pruning is 
vital in this stage in order to create a compatible data 
format to be enabled for classification process, 
however feature selection is performed within the 
classes to remove the unwanted and replicative data 
types. Hybrid feature selection techniques are used 
consisted of C4.5 with ratio gain to enable the training 
data as an input into the suggested NBC. Two classes 
will be achieved in the output data, covert in which 
classified as an attack, and a normal class.  
Furthermore ranking of the covert channel attributes 
will be performed in this stage too, this is in order to 
weight the features gathered through data collection, 
and this is purely to classify the highest valued 
attributes in both labelled classes. More explanation 
will be given in sections 3.2 and 3.3.  
5) Decision stage: the passive warden can take 
different actions such as: drop off the packet, block, 
and audit or limit the bandwidth of the connection as a 
part of mitigation security process. 
3.1 Building the Classifier 
The proposed Nave Bayes Classifier (NBC) is to 
improve the performance of the classification process by 
eliminating the irrelevant or the monotonous attributes 
from the captured dataset, then only tackling the most 
informative sub-values in the classification task. For the 
classification process, the denominator is irrelevant, since 
it will have the same value when for attribute values of the 
Xj as it is the same regardless of the value of Ck, The 
central assumption of Nave Bayesian classification is that 
every value in Xj within each class is independent from 
each other. Next, we get by applying the independent 
probability rule: 
P(X1 | {all left values of Xj}, Ck) = P (X1| Ck)              (2) 
And therefore: 
 P(X1, X2... Xn | Ck) = P (X1|Ck) P (X2|Ck), P (Xn |Ck)     (3) 
 So each factor of the right hand of the equation possible to 
be determined from the training data because Then we can 
say from equation 2 we get:  
 
Where # represents the number of such rates in the training 
set data. Therefore, we can classify the test dataset through 
calculating P (Ck| X1, X2 ... Xn) as this is relevant to: 
P (Ck) P (X1|Ck) P(X2 |Ck) P (X3|Ck) P (Xn |Ck)          (5) 
Let’s apply this to our existing data, first we have 
categorized our training data characteristics into 10 main 
attributes (6 attributes as shown in Table I plus 4 
additional attributes as shown in Table II). Let’s assume 
Xi represents an attribute with its subset here subset i is the 
value held by each attribute X1, X2 … Xn, each group of 
attributes have been given a class Ck in which has a prior 
probability of classifying the attribute into Xi which, 
represent the value created by training data set.  
Fig. 4: Proposed Covert Channel Detection Framework in IPv6 
 
Fig. 5: Suggested Network Topology for Covert Channel 
attacks Simulation  
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Bayes classifier will predict the class according to the 
higher probability (likelihood) which taken by an attribute 
to find the conditional probability of P (Ck| given X1 and 
X2 and X3…and Xn). 
 
3.2 Data Pre-Processing 
1) Data Collection: The explicit unreachability of 
benchmark data on covert channels attacks calls for 
creating new models for IPv6 Intrusion detection systems. 
In our approach, we create primary data through 
simulation of different known and unknown attacks on the 
suggested IPv6 LAN topology (See Figure 6) suing a 
security tool to perform these attacks. Different attacks 
were simulated using covert data in IPv6 header fields. 
Table II shows the pre-processed output data format used 
into NB classification and Figure 6 shows the output 
dataset format with two classified classes. 
 
 
 
We performed different simulations of various attacks, and 
then captured the raw data processed through field 
selection. We used two processes of selection: field 
selection prior to the data pre-processing phase, and 
feature selection post pre- processing phase. 
The input here will be the captured pcap packets and 
should be filtered, transformed and discretized then pre-
processed to create the needed training dataset; this is done 
by applying the Intelligent Heuristic Algorithm (IHA).The 
output is formatted according to the suggested 
classification technique, in our case; we need an Attribute 
Relation File Format (ARFF) containing three headers; 
attribute, value and class as shows in Table II. 
 
 
 
3.3 Feature Selection Algorithm 
 
1) Decision Trees C4.5: Feature selection is the most 
critical step in building security system models it reduces 
data complexity and computational time and efforts. There 
are two methods to perform feature selection in [12], filter 
method and wrapper method, the filter method uses 
measures such as information, consistency or distance to 
compute the relevance of set of features while the wrapper 
predicts the accuracy of a classified as a mean to evaluate 
and assess the goodness of a feature set. 
In our approach, we use a modified C4.5 technique. C4.5 
is a popular method for inductive inference as it tolerate 
noisy data and has the capability to learn disjunctive 
expressions. It is a greedy algorithm and constructs the 
decision trees in a top-down recursive divide-and-conquer 
manner. Decision Trees considered as non-parametric 
estimator that reasonably approximate any function 
according to the increase size of the training or testing 
dataset, so using Nave Bayes Classifier would improve the 
performance in a better result. 
 
2) Information Gain Algorithm: In order to select the best 
test attributes we need to work out the entropy 
measurement to calculate the purity in an arbitrary 
collection of examples. Let S be a set of consisting of s 
data samples. Suppose that the class label attributes has m 
distinct values defining m distinct classes Ck. Moreover, 
let Si be the number of samples of S in class Ck, so we 
need to classify the expected information as follow: 
 
Where Pk is the probability that an arbitrary sample 
belongs to class Ck and estimated by Sk = S. Let attribute 
A obtains x as distinct values, a1, a2 … ax. We can use 
attribute A to split S into x subsets S1, S2 …Sx, where Si 
contains the samples in S which have the value of aj of A. 
Then let Skj be the sample numbers of class Ck in a subset 
Sj. So the entropy in which the expected information in the 
splitting subsets by A will give:  
 
In order to work out the weight we assume the 
term )    to be the jth   subset and is the number of 
samples in the divided subset by total number of samples 
in S in equation (5). For a given subset Sj, 
 
Where Pkj = Skj / Sj   and it is the probability in which any 
sample of Sj would belong to class Ck. 
 
ID Header 
Format 
Value Type Class 
1 Traffic_Class   Numeric Normal or Covert 
2 Flow_Label  Numeric Normal or Covert 
3 Hop_Limit High,Low, 
Moderate 
Normal or Covert 
4 Payload_Length increased,decreased, 
Low 
Normal or Covert 
5 Source_Address Numeric Normal or Covert 
6  Next_Header Numeric Normal or Covert 
7  ICMPv6_Type Numeric Normal or Covert 
8  ICMPv6_Code Numeric Normal or Covert 
9  Reserve_Bit Numeric Normal or Covert 
10 ICMPv6_ 
Payload 
Numeric Normal or Covert 
Table 2: Covert Channels Data Format and Values 
 
Fig 6: Output Dataset in ARFF Format before Classification  
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This will make the entropy value zero if the sample is pure 
as all samples S should belong to one class, and the 
entropy has a maximum positive value such as 1. When 
the sample occasionally is impure and it could contain 
some negative and positive sub value examples also. 
Finally, the information gain expression would be 
achieved by: 
 
 
 
Finally, we work out the gain ratio and calculate as below: 
 
       
 
4. Experiments and Results 
 
The primary dataset in this experiment was obtained 
from a generated script simulating attacks on a separated 
IPv6 LAN network environment from the internet. Due to 
ethical issues concerning Data Protection Act 1998 
realistic attacks are illegal. However, the IPv6 simulated 
topology as shown in Figure 5 configured successfully. 
After summing the proposed processes step 1-3. Packet 
were captured using Wireshark 1.12.1  The training dataset 
was created and streamed into the classification model 
using Weka 3.7 java built database system. We performed 
two segments of experiments using two types of training 
dataset: in phase one we used our primary dataset to 
elaborate the accuracy and the performance improvement 
of the suggested model implementing the suggested 
detection algorithm.  
4.1 Detection Algorithm 
In Figure 7 and 8 we see an example of five other 
implemented logic algorithms of an Intelligent Heuristic 
Algorithm (IHA) to obtain and extract the targeted data 
type from the following fields: flow label, traffic class, hop 
limit, payload length, next header, source address, icmpv6 
type, icmpv6 code, reserve bit, icmpv6 payload. The 
process in this stage starts with checking the collected 
packets, targeted header fields values after being decoded, 
discretized and normalized, the verification is done 
through the validating against the original values of each 
field assigned by to references; IANA and the RFC’s 
2401, 2406, 2675, 4443 and more than 30 RFC’s [22].  
  The algorithm will give an output of pure data format 
ready for classification along to raise a flag whether the 
packet contains covert data or to process normal if it is not 
affected.   
The overall Algorithm is shown in figure 9 describes the 
model functionalities and tasks. The process starts with 
shuffling training dataset samples captured and   
Start
Check Packet 
Fields Format
If FL exhibits ≥ range of 
values between 1 and FFFFF 
hex
If TC value =  value from 
different classes or ≠ Original 
Class value
No
No Yes
Yes
No Attack 
detected
Drop Packet and 
Block Connection
End
 
 
 
pre- processed, then we select 20% of the whole packets 
and run the IHA to create the compatible data format 
specify the covert channel characteristics. 
Start
Check Packet 
Fields Format
If HL pattern carry values = 
Original Values assigned by 
IANA and RFC’s
If PL≠  16 bits, ≥ Jumbo 
gram = 65,535 hex
Yes
No
Yes
No Attack 
detected
Drop Packet and 
Block Connection
End
 
 
 
      However we used two different training datasets to 
examine the detection and performance accuracy of the 
proposed algorithm. Then we extract the attributes and 
each subset values up down to level 5 of each instance. We 
run the modified C4.5 along with Info Gain feature 
selection to obtain the decision tree and to measure the 
entropy of the pre pruned classes and the ranking of the 
most weighted detected attribute signalling an alarm.   
Fig. 7: Intelligent Heuristic Detection Algorithm for Flow 
Label and Traffic Class fields in IPv6 
 
Fig. 8: Intelligent Detection Algorithm for Hop Limit and 
Payload Length fields in IPv6 
 
(10) 
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The IHA depends solemnly on the exact specifications 
given by those two protocol standards details IANA and 
RFCs which demand all network protocol fields “should” 
or “must” be used in their implementation over the 
network. This means the possibility of covert channels 
[24] as the firewalls don’t depict these modified values.  
Finally running the Naïve Bayes classifier on the input 
data to classify statistically the covert channels and expose 
the accuracy percentage of the depicted and classified 
targeted data format.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cross validation is done through evaluation process of 
the experimental results given from the classification 
module. Running each data training and data testing set 10 
folds with different feature selection and with a 
combination with the suggested NBC and feature 
selection, then calculate the True Positive Rate, False 
Positive Rate and the precision of the targeted attributes.  
 
4.2 Primary Dataset Testing (Phase 1) 
 The primary data set used as a training dataset in the first 
attempt consisted of 700.000 instances which were 
collected from the captured packets, then we performed 
detection process through the covert channel’s analyser as 
mentioned in step 2 by running the IHA in order to detect 
examine the input filtered data and to detect covert types 
anomaly) and normal data type as the final version prior to 
the classification process is shown in Figure 6. 
 The simulated attacks and commands as shown in Table 3 
and should fall in one of the following four types of 
attacks [23]: 
1) Probe.  
2) Denial of Service (DoS).  
3) Covert Channel: Echo_request, echo_reply, 
false traffic class, false flow label, increase or 
decrease in the hop-by-hop values, set false 
address, increase of Payload length value.   
4) Root to Local (R2L). 
 
 
Attack Test Case Performed Commands 
Payload fields 
covert channels 
Scapy: send(IPv6(dst= 
"2001:db6:675c:7000::1") 
/IPv6DestOpt(options= 
[PadN(optdata=("22222222") 
)]+[PadN(optdata= 
("3333333333333333"))]) / 
ICMPv6EchoRequest(id=1)) 
Covert channel 
Using PadN Option 
IPv6DestOpt(type=02data=”YYYYY”)/ 
icmpechorequest 
 
There are two types of Machine Learning; Supervised and 
unsupervised. When there is a training dataset and testing 
dataset processed to build a model and create a pattern it 
called supervised, if there is no training dataset it called 
unsupervised machine learning.  
  For the supervised learning algorithm, we used the 
learning dataset created by IHA carrying the characteristic 
described in Table 1 and 2. The training dataset as shown 
in Table 5 contained 10 attributes or features with one 
target value or labelled class either normal or covert 
(attack). Then we performed 10 fold cross validation to 
test the efficiency of the built model through the training 
phases. We performed all experiments in Windows 7 OS 
platform, CPU Core i5 processor, with 8 GB RAM. The 
experimental result of the created primary data in phase 
one testing shown in Table 4. 
 
 
 
4.3 Classification Metrics 
 
The normal classification machine process normally 
intakes the unknown input data as Yu Liu mentioned in 
[20]. This is to identify the targeted class according to the 
assigned perimeter ‘Covert’ if the packet contains 
anomaly, and ‘normal’ if the packet belongs to the source 
type. The accuracy percentage is the actual measurement 
for a liable 
Classifier 
Acc 
(%) TPR FPR Precision Time 
Naïve Bayes 76.65 0.766 0.23 1.000 0.22 
NB+InfoGain 65.89 0.833 0.38 0.827 0.18 
NBC 94.47 0.985 0.02 0.960 0.15 
NB+SubSetVal 55.32 0.81 0.32 0.274 0.25 
1. Scramble the training dataset samples 
2. Select and Create 20% from the shuffled 
packets. 
3. Run IHA on data from step 2 
4. Extract a set of preassigned attributes with 
its subset level 5 values instances. 
5. Run C4.5 and Info Gain   
 
 
6. Repeat 10 times (step1-5) 
7. Collect all attributes from 10 rounds. 
8. Run Naïve Bayes Classifier on the training 
data with test data using only the latest 
features collected in step 7.  
Fig. 9: The Suggested Hybrid Feature Selection Algorithm  
 
Table 3: A sample of Covert Channel Test Cases Commands  
Table 4: Accuracy of NBC in comparison to other techniques 
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classification technique in which consists of the following 
metrics as shown in Table 4:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
true positive, false positive, true negative, false negative, 
precision.  Below is a brief explanation of the mentioned 
metrics [21]: 
 
1) True Positives: it is the correctly classified 
packets according to the assigned type. 
2) False Positives: it is the incorrectly classified 
packets according to the assigned type. 
3) Precision: it shows the correct instances that 
accurately holds the targeted type, in which 
picked up among the classified assigned 
type. 
 
4.4 Secondary Dataset Testing (Phase 2) 
 
In order to extend the proficiency of the pro- posed model, 
we used the DARPA 1999 IDS dataset [15]. This dataset 
was collected at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) in Lincoln Lab to evaluate intrusion detection 
systems, however it lacks instances of IPv6 attack types 
except the ICMPv4, and IP ID covert channels [14] that 
has similar techniques principles manipulating such 
attacks. McHugh and Mahoney in [11], [15] claimed that 
DARPA dataset does not containing some background 
noise i.e. packet storms, strange packets, etc. 
This dataset has binary class attribute as shown in Table 8 
along with numerous realistic numbers of training and test 
instances that simplifies our experiment in this paper. Each 
connection record consists of 41 features and labelled in 
order sequences such as: 1,2,3,4,5,6,7... 41 and falls into 
four main categories below and their details are in Table 6. 
 
1. Category 1 (1-9): Contains features of individual 
TCP connections.  
2.  Category 2 (10-22): Contains features within a 
connection suggested by domain knowledge. 
3. Category 3 (23-31): Contains traffic features 
computed using two-second time windows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Category 4 (32-41): Contains traffic features 
computed using a two-second time window from 
destination to host. 
Ciza in [15] described the features and values of NSL-
KDD99 cup including a version of DARPA 1999 dataset 
attacks types. The suggested NBC in testing  DARPA 
training dataset gave a slightly higher detection rate than 
our primary captured data in comparison to other 
techniques used in the process as shown in Table 7. The 
second phase with 10 folds resulting a lower false rate and 
a higher detection rate so far. 
 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
The results of both experiments confirm the accuracy of 
initial hypothesis in which our NBCs performance is 
impressive with regards to the significant accuracy of each 
classifier detection rate in separate testing phases so far. In 
Table 4 and Figure 10, we observe the distinguished 
R # TC FL HL PL NH SA Type Code RB PYL Class 
1 0 0 High Increased 0 0 0 1 0 1 Covert 
2 1 1 Low Unchanged 1 1 1 0 1 1 Covert 
3 1 1 Moderate Descreased 1 1 0 0 0 0 Normal 
4 1 1 Moderate Decreased 1 1 0 1 0 0 Normal 
5 1 1 Low Unchanged 1 1 1 0 1 1 Covert 
6 1 1 Moderate Decreased 1 1 0 0 0 0 Normal 
7 0 1 Moderate Unchanged 1 1 1 0 1 1 Covert 
8 1 1 Low Unchanged 1 1 0 0 1 1 Covert 
9 0 1 Moderate Unchanged 1 1 1 1 0 0 Covert 
10 1 1 Low Unchanged 1 1 1 0 1 1 Covert 
Category Type 
Normal Normal 
DoS smurf, neptune, back, teardrop, pod, land, apacha2 
 Back, Mailbomb, Netpune, Pod, Processtable, 
Udpstorm, Buffer_overflow 
Probe satan, ipsweep, portsweep, nmap, saint 
R2L, warezmaster, ftp_write, multihop, phf, warezclient, 
guess_passwd spy, imap, worm, xlock, Xsnoop, 
Named, snmpguess, snmpgetattack, sendmail, 
U2R buffer_overflow,rootkit, loadmodule, perl, 
Httprunnel, PS, Sqlattack, Xterm 
Classifier 
Acc 
(%) TPR FPR Precision Time 
Naïve Bayes 80.04 0.802 0.198 0.907 0.27 
NB+InfoGain 93.67 0.939 0.013 0.939 0.23 
NBC 96.46 0.945 0.012 0.989 0.20 
NB+SubSetVal 96.36 0.936 0.016 0.977 0.25 
Table 7:  Accuracy Detection of NBC Using Primary Data 
  
Table 6 Attack Categories in NSL DARPA Dataset.  
 
Table 5: Sample outcome of Covert Channel Characteristics from Analysis process 
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correctness and low false positive of the suggested 
classifier by 94.46% after working out 10 folds using 
testing data and the cross validation True Positive 
detection Rate was 96.46%. Let’s discuss the experimental 
and evaluation results in more details. 
 
 
 
 
Running the IHA to process the selected characteristics of 
covert channels in IPv6 and processing the classification 
module resulted better performance with amazing 
outcomes. We performed experiments on the original 
dataset which includes 10 attributes using Nave Bayes 
classifier once, and Subset Evaluation Technique, Naïve 
Bayes only, NBC with InfoGain algorithm in a second run 
with 10 folds each; the results were significantly obvious 
as shown in Table 4 and 7. The modified feature selection 
technique offered a higher prediction rate in detection 
process as shown in Figure 10 and 12, in addition to 
creating a better positive impact on the precision rate of 
the proposed method as shown in Figure 11 and 13. 
 
The suggested decision tree C4.5 created a positive power 
along with Nave Bayes algorithm on the detection rate 
with a precision accuracy of 0.960% as shown in Table 4. 
Here we observe an obvious improvement with 94.46% in 
comparison to the first experimental results testing similar 
implemented techniques. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The NBC is fastest among other classifiers because fewer 
attributes are involved in learning process, however it 
seems to be liable for testing large size of data such as 
DARPA example, this is quite clear in Table 7 and Figure 
12 and 13. The time that our proposed NBC spent in 
building the data model is 0.15 milliseconds in comparison 
to other elapsed time using NB alone was 0.22 
milliseconds, NBC with InfoGain technique was 0.18 
milliseconds, and finally the result of testing SubsetVal 
was 0.25 as shown in Table4. 
 
 The Amazing performance of our suggested Model has an 
improvements of 0.3 milliseconds time elapsed in building 
the model in compare to InfoGain, and 0.07 milliseconds 
better than NB, and finally 0.10 milliseconds in compare 
to SubSetVal classification technique as shown in Figure 
11. 
 
The True Positive Rate using NBC for the first detection 
process was 0.985% in which is an obvious better 
performance of the suggested algorithm in comparison of 
other records of TPR; 0.152% against InfoGain, 0.219% 
against NB, 0.175% against SubsetVal. 
 False Positive Rate also was tremendously better and low 
percentage with 0.02% in compare to all other tested 
techniques rates; 0.36% against InfoGain, 0.21% against 
NB 0.30% against SubsetVal.  
 
 
 
Nr Feature Type Nr Feature Type 
1 Duration 21 Is_host_login 
2 Protocol_type 22 Is_guest_login 
3 Service 23 Count 
4 Flag 24 Srv_count 
5 Src_bytes 25 Serror_rate 
6 Dst_bytes 26 Srv_error_rate 
7 Land 27 Rerror_rate 
8 Wrong_fragment 28 Srv_error_rate 
9 Urgent 29 Same_srv_rate 
10 Hot 30 Diff_srv_rate 
11 Num_failed_logins 31 Srv_diff_host_rate 
12 Logged_in 32 Dst_host_count 
13 Num_compromised 33 Dst_host_srv_count 
14 Root_shell 34 Dst_host_same_srv_rate 
15 Su_attempted 35 Dst_host_diff_srv_rate 
16 Num_root 36 Dst_host_same_src_port_rat
e 
17 Num_file_creation 37 Dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate 
18 Num_shells 38 Dst_host_serror_rate 
19 Num_access_files 39 Dst_host_srv_rerror_rate 
20 Num_outbound_cmds 40 Dsthost_rerror_rate 
  41 Class 
Table 8: Attack Attribute Types in NSL DARPA Dataset 
 
Fig. 10 Covert Channel Detection Accuracy 
Fig. 11: Precision Rates of the Suggested Model 
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The DARPA dataset has extraordinary huge amount of 
data so we had to cut (20%) of the whole dataset to create 
testing dataset with 41 attributes in order to evaluate the 
accuracy performance of the proposed method. NBC 
performance also potential in phase 2 despite of using 
more instances than the original dataset as shown in Figure 
11. Finally Table 7 and Figure 12 show the accuracy of the 
detection rate in using NBC which is (96.46%) and 
potentially higher than using other techniques as well as 
the time elapsed in building the data model is 0.20 
milliseconds. Occasionally the Mean value of the 
suggested NBC resulted a better among the other tested 
techniques too as shown in Table 9. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The cross validation result was impressive in testing 
DARPA dataset which consisted of 4.900.000 instances 
confirming the high accuracy of the suggested NBC. As 
we see in Table 7. The detection rate between the NBC 
and NB was 16.42%, against NBC with InfoGain was 
2.79%, and against Subset Val techniques was 0.1%.  
 
 The evaluation results of the True Positive Rate (TPR) 
also was distinguish and higher than the compared 
techniques with the following differences; NB has 0.802% 
so the difference was 0.143% against it, InfoGain has 
0.939% the difference was 0.006% against it, Subset Val 
was 0.936% so the difference was 0.009% against it. In 
order to observe the error detection rate we examined the 
False Positive Rate (FPR) for NBC against the other 
techniques as shown in Table 7 and Figure 12 the 
following statistical analysis were given; NB has a higher 
rate of FTP with 0.186% than the suggested model, this 
means that Naïve Bayes alone could not flag and detect the 
utmost real security threats as well as InfoGain error was 
0.01%, and Subset Val has 0.04% false positive rate in 
detection process. 
The above analysis of evaluation results and figures during 
the cross validation indicated a better and higher accuracy 
in NBC in comparison to the other feature selection 
techniques testing  huge size of data, furthermore even 
testing the whole nearly five million instances or cutting 
20% of the whole data size. We can consider that this 
approach is one of the effective methods to depict the 
unknown attacks in the future. We perceive the differences 
and the better performance in the rest of the statistical 
figures given in Precision rates and Data model creation 
time elapsed testing DARPA dataset as shown in Table 7, 
Figure 12 and 13. 
The mean value of the overall testing techniques as shown 
in Table 9 give an indication of the high performance too 
for the suggested NBC with the highest value of 95.46% 
against all other figures in the same table.      
To see the best attributes given in the ranking calculation 
as shown in Table 10, we observe the highest attribute 
classified in which the ICMPv6_PYL is obtaining level 1 
as it has a sequence number 8 in the covert channel 
characteristics testing list. However Hop_Limit attribute 
was the most splitting features among the other tested 
features with three subset values as shown in Figure 14 
and 15. And finally Figure 16 shows as the weighting 
values of each attributes holding the best relevant 
attributes and in corresponds to Table 10. 
 
 
 
Dataset 
 
NB 
 
NBC 
without 
FS 
NBC 
 
C4.5 
 
SubsetValue 
 
Covert 
Channel 76.65 65.86 94.47 55.32 60.32 
Other 
Attacks 80.04 93.67 96.46 72.56 96.36 
Mean 78.34 79.76 95.46 63.94 78.34 
Fig. 12: Precision Rates of the Suggested NBC Testing DARPA 
Dataset 
 
Fig. 13: The Optimal Performance of NBC in Testing DARPA 
Dataset 
 
Table 9: Comparison of Covert Channel Attack Detection and 
Other Unknown Attacks   
 
Fig. 14: Hop Limit has the highest Information and the Splitting 
Attribute at the root of the Decision Tree 
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5 Conclusion 
 
A new hybrid method in feature selection that uses C4.5 
decision trees with Information gain technique is 
presented. This method is used to classify and detect 
covert channels in IPv6. The suggested Model aimed to 
use advanced Data Mining Techniques in such complex 
designed network protocol vulnerabilities, however the 
suggested NBC was improved by Nave Bayes learning 
algorithm. 
 
This proposed approach implementing an enhanced feature 
selection technique i.e. C4.5 decision trees with 
Information Gain in a heterogeneous form, reduces the 
probabilistic stimulation, which leads to higher accuracy in 
detection and classification process, consequently led to 
lower false negative rate (FNR) and higher true positive 
rate (TPR).  
 
The reason behind this result is that we reduced the 
entropy and the noisy data in both training datasets: Our 
Original primary data and the secondary data DARPA 
1999 dataset led to pure data pruning and significant 
compatible data as shown in Figure 6. Our approach 
examined and depicted the hidden covert channel features 
selected in the primary dataset of the IPv6 and its attacks 
in captured packets 
We have answered the research question about the 
possibilities of existence of such complex hidden storage 
channels in IPv6 and explained the security threats impact 
created by attackers on network security policy and 
privacy, furthermore we also justified our findings by 
practical evidence and evaluation of the suggested new 
model to mitigate such vulnerabilities in IPv6. 
 
Future work is further planned to examine the TCP and 
UDP covert channels weighting and classifying their 
attributes implementing different approach and techniques 
in order to obtain more accurate and efficient results. In 
addition to the ranking trees process, we aim to use more 
different advanced feature selection algorithms to 
elaborate the vulnerabilities in the oversight design of the 
TCP/IP Suite Protocol.  
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